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31 Introduction
This paper investigates whether the regulation of insider trading or insider trading 
laws can be effective.1 Following Henry Manne's publication of Insider Trading and the 
Stock Market, the debate surrounding the question of insider trading and whether or not it 
should be regulated has received a lot of attention from lawyers, economists, and 
financiers and a prolific literature has ensued. One particular aspect of the debate was 
centered on the question of whether the regulation of insider trading or insider trading 
laws are effective. Indeed, with the evolution of insider trading laws, students of insider 
trading laws have attempted to see whether these laws are effective in discouraging 
insiders from trading on non-public information. Whether they focus on insider trading in 
general or insider trading around particular corporate events, by and large, the consensus 
1
 We use the standard definition of insider trading adopted in the literature, which is the use of material 
nonpublic information about a corporation in a securities transaction. Insiders are traditionally defined as 
any individual who has access or has been given access to inside information. The American legislation 
uses the same definition of insider trading. However, it introduces a distinction within the class of insiders 
by differentiating registered (inside) insiders from (unregistered) outside insiders (tippees). Registered 
insiders (or corporate insiders) are defined by the Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as 
every director and officer of the corporation plus any owners of more than 10% of the corporation's equity. 
They are required by the Section 16(a) to report periodically all their trade in equity securities to the SEC. 
Unregistered insiders (or outside-insiders) are also in possession of material nonpublic information but are 
not required to report their transactions to the SEC. Unregistered insiders' acquisition of inside information 
can be direct in the course of their work (investment bankers, lawyers, risk arbitragers, accountants, 
financial printers) or indirect by the intermediary of registered insiders (tippees).
4was almost unanimous: insider trading laws are ineffective, they are unsuccessful in 
deterring insiders from trading on non-public information. 
Although these empirical studies reveal very informative and can provide interesting 
and illustrative evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of regulation, these studies are not 
useful if one wants to make a case against the government-enforced regulation of insider 
trading based on its effectiveness simply because none of these studies investigate the 
causes of such ineffectiveness. Actually, the only conclusion that one can derive from 
this empirical literature is that government regulation of insider trading is ineffective. 
However, the fact that the empirical literature shows that government regulation of 
insider trading has been so far ineffective cannot be interpreted as showing that 
government regulation cannot be effective and, therefore, should be repealed. 
Another problem is that, even outside the empirical literature, almost no systematic 
research on this issue has been conducted.2 Therefore, the contribution of this paper is to 
fill that gap. In this paper, we will investigate whether regulation can be effective in 
deterring insiders from trading on inside information.3 We will show in this paper that 
there is a theoretical as well as practical impossibility for government regulation of 
insider trading to be effective in deterring insiders from trading on inside information.
2
 An exception is Matthew Spiegel and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, The Efficacy of Insider Trading 
Regulation, Working Paper 257, Berkeley, University of California, Institute of Business and Economic 
Research (1995). However, we shall see, their argument is incomplete.
3
 Another justification for investigating whether insider trading regulation can be effective is the fact that 
most advocates of insider trading regulation by and large seem to assume cannot fail. See Jhinyoung Shin, 
The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 49 (1996) and Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading 
Laws Work? Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-19, 2 n. 4 (2000).
5First, we discuss whether the regulation of insider trading can be effective. Second, 
we will show to what extend our analysis is consistent with the empirical literature.
Finally, we will offer some concluding remarks.
2 Can the regulation of insider trading effective?
In this section, we investigate whether regulation can be effective in deterring 
insiders from trading on inside information. We show in this section that there is a 
theoretical as well as practical impossibility for government regulation of insider trading 
to be effective in deterring insiders from trading on inside information.
2.1 Intangibility, First Accessing Person, and Information Network
In order to understand the problems faced by the regulator, we need to understand 
insider trading laws' main objective. The regulation of insider trading prohibits insiders 
from using inside information in securities transaction decisions. In other words, the main 
objective of the regulator is to prevent nonpublic information from circulating in the 
stock markets. In attempting to do so, the regulator faces various problems that are 
related to the nature of the good which he or she attempts to control: information.
The first problem the regulatory authority must face is that information is an 
intangible good. Therefore, compared to a physical good, no physical barrier can prevent 
it from flowing and circulating. It can be argued that information can be prevented from 
circulating or even being used as soon as it has been embodied in a piece of paper such as 
a note or a memorandum. Therefore, the argument goes, the insider who has access to the 
materialized information and could trade on it is going to refrain from doing so because 
she would be under greater scrutiny. 
6While this might be true, the regulator will still be confronted with an additional 
problem. Even if the insider refrains from trading on inside information, nothing prevents 
her from communicating it to a third party. To circulate, there is no need for the 
information to be under a tangible form. As soon as the insider has access to the 
information, there is no way to know whether she has communicated what she knows to a 
third party insofar as she did not transmit the information in its materialized aspect. In 
other words, the regulator faces a "first accessing person" problem, that is, there is 
always a first person who has access to the information. As a consequence, even if this 
person is under great scrutiny, the regulator is confronted with an additional problem. He 
cannot prevent this person from communicating this information to a third party except 
by prohibiting this person from accessing the information, which is impossible because 
that would mean prohibiting her from performing her job. 
This problem of a first accessing person aggravates when there is more than one 
person with access to the information. In the corporation, more than a few people have 
access to inside information; there is a myriad of individuals who come across 
confidential information on a regular basis in the course of their duties. Moreover, some 
of these individuals are not directly employed by the corporation; they work on a 
temporary basis for the corporation and yet have access to inside information.4 As the 
4
 See, for example, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997), and United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) cases, where the persons charged in 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Exchange Commission 
10b-5 were not directly employed by the corporation where the confidential information had been 
produced.
7number of people accessing confidential information increases, the number of third 
parties with access to information increases as well.
Moreover, the regulator's problem does not stop at the level of third parties. Third 
parties can also communicate the indirectly acquired information to other parties which 
themselves can communicate this information to other parties.5 The network by which the 
information circulates can become very complex and the higher the degree of complexity 
of the network, the greater the difficulty for the regulator to prevent the information from 
circulating. Also the regulator will have problems tracing back the information to its 
source. This latter condition is necessary if the regulatory authority wants to eliminate 
illegal insider trading and deter individuals from trading on the basis of inside 
information. The effectiveness of a regulation relies upon its effectiveness to prevent first 
accessing individuals from communicating inside information to third parties. In other 
words, to be effective the regulation of insider trading must attack the problem at its 
source, that is, the first individuals who have access to inside information.
Finally, the more complex the network through which the information flows, the 
more distorted the information is going to be. In other words, because individuals have 
different interpretation and different ways of communicating the information, the 
5
 Sometimes, they may communicate the information even without knowing they are doing so. The author 
would like to thank Professor Steven Call for drawing his attention to this point. See, for example, SEC v. 
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984): George Platt, Phoenix's CEO and, therefore, an insider in 
regard to Phoenix, discussing with his wife about a recent business trip to New York at a track meet, 
inadvertently communicated inside information to Coach Switzer who laid down a on a row of bleachers 
behind them; inside information that he later used to buy a substantial number of Phoenix shares and tipped 
off a number of his friends.
8information progressing through the network is going to be subject to transformations. 
The further the information goes into the network, the more likely the information is 
going to be different from its original form. As a consequence, even if the regulator has 
been able to detect a potential illegal transaction based on inside information, he still has 
to identify what the inside information is on which the potential malefactor has based her 
transaction. 
The problem we have just discussed is not totally new. Our analysis is reminiscent of 
the analysis that we find in the economics of prohibition and the consequences that 
prohibition entails, that is, the emergence of illegal parallel, or black, markets as a 
mechanism to circumvent the regulation. Manne already described this phenomenon of 
illegal markets for inside information.6
We now turn to another problem the regulator must face: the inefficacy of the 
mechanism of detection for illegal insider trading. This problem is also due to the 
intangible nature of non-public information.
2.2 Circumstantial Evidence, Subjectivism, and Strategic Behaviors
Meulbroek (1992) explains that regulatory authorities (such as the SEC) use a 
multipronged strategy to detect and prosecute illegal insider trading.7 The first source 
comes from individuals informing on other people. The other source relies upon tangible 
evidence ("a smoking gun") such as notes, memoranda, or telephone conversations which 
indicate that an investor traded on the basis of inside information. The last strategy relies 
on circumstantial, or statistical, evidence to detect and prosecute insiders. 
6 See Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 59-75 (1966).
7 See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. Fin. 1661 (1992)
9The SEC usually lacks hard evidence due to the intangible nature of inside 
information. As a consequence, it relies often only on circumstantial evidence to detect 
and prosecute illegal insider trading.8,9 The use of circumstantial evidence, that is, of 
8
 Id. at 1680. Meulbroek also documents that 41% of all insider trading investigations are triggered on the 
basis of information provided by informants. In the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
of 1988 (See Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, November 19, 1988, P.L. 100-704, 
Sec 21A (e), H.R. 5133.), the Congress gives authority to the SEC to award bounties to informants who 
provides information leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from an insider, from a person who tipped 
information to an insider, or from a person who controlled directly or indirectly an insider. Moreover, this 
bounty program allows the SEC to give up to 10% of the civil penalty recovered by the SEC or the 
Attorney General. While the SEC does rely also on such a mechanism to prosecute insider trading, there is 
no empirical available evidence that such a program has leaded to an increase in the number of successful 
indictments or a decrease in insider trading. It is also difficult to appreciate to what extent such a program 
can be effective in deterring insider trading insofar as one principal consequence of such a program is that 
most of the informants will use such a mechanism in order to pursue a different goal mainly related to 
revenge or envy in the same way that tax evasion investigations are triggered on information provided by 
angry wives or jealous neighbors. It is therefore difficult to asses the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
9
 SEC John Chad made at several occasions clear that many insider trading prosecutions rely on statistical 
evidence. For example, when asked during the 1983 Congressional Hearings whether the SEC could have 
successfully prosecuted a particular case if the standard of proof for an insider trading conviction was 
raised, he answer "it would be difficult, because that case, like most of these cases, was built on 
circumstantial evidence" (Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance. 98th Congress. First Session on 
H.R. 559. April 13, 1983. Serial Number 98-33: p. 61.) Another example comes from a SEC memorandum 
from Office of the General Counsel to Chairman John Shad (1983), in the SEC expresses its concern about 
the idea of raising the burden of proof to a higher level:
10
"unusual price movements on insider trading days," poses several problems that 
undermine the effectiveness of the regulation itself.10 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995) 
develop an interesting model to explain "why the SEC cannot effectively use statistical 
"…. the burden of proof in Commission injunctive actions is proof by preponderance of evidence. 
Commentators have suggested that in light of the possibility of a judge imposing a higher sanction, a higher 
burden of proof should be required in actions seeking the proposed civil penalty.
On the other hand it should be noted that the proof in many of the Commission's insider trading cases 
depends heavily on circumstantial evidence. A higher burden of proof, such as a clear and convincing 
standard, would make it more difficult for the Commission to prove its case, particularly in insider trading 
cases where most cases are built on circumstantial evidence."
Examples of recent cases based on circumstantial evidence brought by the SEC and in which courts 
accept circumstantial evidence as an appropriate means in proving insider trading in SEC fraud cases are: 
US v. Mylett. Docket No. 96-1309, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 97F.3d 663; 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26113; Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) p. 99, 326, 1996; SEC v. Warde. Docket No. 96-
6190. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 151. F.3d 42; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15991; 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) p. 90, 239; 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1131 (1998); SEC v. Sargent. No. 
00-1293. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 229 F.3d 68; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25273. 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91, 244.55 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1103. 2000; United States SEC v. 
Ginsburg. Case No. 99-8694-CIV-RYSKAMP/ VITUNAC. United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida. West Palm Beach Division.242 F. Supp. 2d 1310; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25292. 2002; 
and SEC v. Franco. 01 Civ. 3872(JGK). United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
2003. A research on LexisNexis Academic showed that 168 Federal and State Cases have been prosecuted 
under the basis of circumstantial evidence in the last ten years, 129 in the last five years, 48 in the last two 
years, 20 in the last year.
10
 Meulbroek, supra note 7, at 1689.
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information to identify and deter corporate insiders who may trade on material, non-
public information."11
Before entering the details of their analysis, it is necessary to briefly explain how a 
mechanism to detect and prosecute insiders relying upon circumstantial evidence works. 
They describe the functioning of the mechanism as follows:
First, the RA [regulatory authority] establishes a rule, which stipulates that if a 
certain random variable (e.g., the price move during a trading day) exceeds a certain 
exogenous threshold, and the trader in question has traded during the day, he will be 
prosecuted for illegal insider trading. Second, investors obtain information and trade. 
Third, the RA observes the size of each investor's trade and the transaction price. The 
RA also observes any subsequent price changes. … Based upon these observations, 
and the rule established in the first stage, the RA determines whether or not to 
prosecute particular individuals.12
In other words, if the trading volume of a trader is "abnormal" in comparison to his 
usual trading volume, if the timing of his transaction is "suspect" regarding the disclosure 
of a material information, or if the transaction took place prior to a significant subsequent 
price movement; therefore, the regulatory authority will consider that such a transaction 
has been realized on the basis of inside information.
Most of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam's argument is largely inspired by Lucas's work 
on rational expectations and his criticism of econometric models that neglect the effect of 
11
 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, supra note 2.
12
 Id. at 9-10.
12
agents' rational reaction to anticipated future macroeconomic policy decisions.13 When 
trying to detect and prosecute insiders using circumstantial evidence, the regulatory 
authority is faced with a major problem. Once the rule used by the regulator to detect and 
prosecute insiders becomes known to insiders, the insiders possessing the most accurate 
information are going to modify strategically their behavior to avoid investigations.14 In 
other words, knowing that the regulator's rule to trigger an investigation is based on price 
movement during a trading day exceeding a certain threshold, insiders possessing
confidential information, being the most able to make more accurate estimates regarding 
future stock prices, are also going to be the most able to predict when the regulator is 
going to suspect that non-public information has been circulating and insider trading took
place. Insiders with more accurate confidential information are, consequently, going to 
rationally adapt their trading strategy in order to avoid the stock prices reaching the 
threshold above which the regulator will start investigating insiders' transactions. 
Therefore, the argument goes, the individuals with less accurate information – being less 
capable to predict the magnitude of the stock price changes resulting from their 
transactions – will be more likely to trigger the investigations and be prosecuted on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence. In other words, when the regulation of insider trading 
relies on statistical evidence to detect and prosecute insider trading, as it is mostly the 
case today, the population of individuals who are going to be prosecuted will consist 
essentially of people who have traded on the basis of immaterial information. In
13 See Robert E. Lucas, Econometric Policy Evaluations: A Critique. 1 Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public 
Policy 19 (1976).
14
 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, supra note 2, at 27.
13
conclusion, insider trading regulation cannot be effective. It does not discourage insiders 
in possession of non-public material information from trading since the quality of 
information they possess makes it unlikely they will be detected and prosecuted.15
There is no doubt that Spiegel and Subrahmanyam provided us with a very powerful 
model explaining why regulation of insider trading cannot be effective in discouraging 
insiders from trading on material non-public information. However, there are at least two 
additional considerations that should be taken into account when explaining the 
ineffectiveness of a regulation relying upon circumstantial evidence to detect and 
prosecute insider trading.
First, although the literature tends to focus on the active aspect of insider trading –
trading on the basis of inside information – from a technical point of view, insider trading 
can also take a passive form. Insider trading does not automatically imply that a securities 
transaction occurs. An insider trading takes place when an individual has used of 
information not available to the public to make a decision regarding a securities 
transaction. In other words, if an individual in possession of inside information decides to 
cancel a securities transaction, that is, not buy or sell stocks, technically, she is also liable 
for illegal insider trading since her decision was made on the basis of inside information. 
Put differently, if an individual either has avoided a loss or has realized a profit by not 
realizing a securities transaction and her decision was determined on her having non-
public material information , she has committed an insider trading.
Because there is no trading involved even though there is decision, this type of insider 
trading cannot be detected. Since the regulator relies mostly on statistical evidence 
15
 Id. at 21.
14
(observation of stock price changes) to detect and infer whether insider trading occurred, 
it is impossible for him to detect this form of insider trading for the reason that such 
activity simply does not involve stock price changes per se.
Another issue that deserves attention when discussing the effectiveness of regulation 
relying on circumstantial evidence to detect and prosecute insider trading is that 
information as well as inside information do not have any objective predictive power or 
objective value. Holding particular information regarding a particular corporate event
does not give an individual the ability to predict with certainty the direction or magnitude 
of future stock price changes. Information is always subject to individuals' subjective 
interpretations, which vary with individuals' experiences and knowledge.16 Therefore, 
when individuals use information (public or not) in profit-seeking decisions, the success 
of their decisions does depend of the direction and magnitude of price changes. However, 
the latter depend on whether or not market participants interpreted the same information 
as they did. In other words, while insiders have technically an informational advantage by 
holding information not yet available to the public when they are making their decision, 
the success of their expectations is ultimately conditional upon the other market 
participants' interpretations regarding the information and resulting expectations once the
non-public information has been disclosed to them. Therefore, an insider may make a 
transaction on the basis of inside information expecting that market participants are going 
16
 See, for example, Ludwig M. Lachmann, Professor Shackle on Economic Significance of Time, 11 
Metroeconomica (April/August 1959) rep. in Ludwig M. Lachmann, Capital, Expectations, and the Market 
Process: Essays on the Theory of the Market Economy at 81-93 (1977), Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises 
to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J.l Econ. Lit. 54 (1976), and 
Ludwig M. Lachmann, The Market as an Economic Process (1986).
15
to react in a particular way once the information is disclosed but it is possible that market 
participants are not going to react in the expected way.17 As a result, instead of realizing a 
profit or avoiding a loss as expected, the insider may perfectly realize the opposite.
The fact that information is a subjective concept and the outcome of insider's decision 
depends on other market participants' interpretation and resulting decisions is also an 
obstacle to the effectiveness of the regulation of insider trading. The resulting implication 
is that, while the insider has broken the law, the regulator will not receive any signal that 
could help him to infer that insider trading has occurred because insider's expectations 
regarding the reaction of market participants to the disclosure of the information were 
inaccurate.
17
 One could argue that, while in theory our argument is true, everybody in practice as the same 
interpretation of the information. A typical example is that everybody will interpret a bad earnings report 
the same way. Actually, this is not totally true in the sense that we mean by interpretation of the 
information the reaction that the information is going to induce is the person who has access to it. The fact 
that the firm has experimented bad earnings in the past year does not mean that everybody is going to sell 
his shares.  The reaction to a bad earnings report depends of whether shareholders interpret this bad earning 
report as a signal that the firm is on the downward slope in terms of performance or it is just due to a bad 
economic conjuncture. In the same way, a takeover announcement will not create the same reactions among 
shareholders. Some of them may believe that it is the takeover for diversification purposes might be a bad 
strategy. Others might believe that the takeover is just a mean for the acquiring management team to 
increase its prestige, compensation packages, perks, and so on. It is in this sense that we argue that 
information is always subject to individuals' subjective interpretation. See Ludwig M. Lachmann, An 
Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in Louis M. Spadaro (Ed.), New 
Directions in Austrian Economics, at 3-4 (1978).
16
2.3 Strategic Behavior and Liquidity
In 1984, former SEC chairman, John Shad argued that the securities laws and, more 
particularly, anti-insider trading laws were at the origin of the success of U.S. securities 
markets:
Fifty years ago, in the depths of the depression, the nation's securities markets were 
demoralized. Today, they are by far the best capital markets the world has ever 
known – the broadest [the most liquid], the most active and efficient, and the fairest. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has played an important role in the 
restoration of public confidence … [and] has discharged with distinction its mandate 
to protect investors and maintain fair and orderly markets.18
Later, in his speech to the "SEC speaks" Conference, then-SEC chairman, Arthur 
Levitt restated that the SEC through the regulation of insider trading played a key role in 
the current success of American securities markets. He comments:
Our markets are a success precisely because they enjoy the world's highest level of 
confidence. Investors put their capital to work – and put their fortunes at risk –
because they trust that the marketplace is honest. They know that our securities laws 
require free, fair, and open transactions.19
It is therefore a quite accepted argument that the securities laws and, more 
particularly, the regulation of insider trading has largely contributed to the success of the 
18 See John Shad at 1 (1984) quoted in Amar Bhide, The Hidden costs of stock market liquidity, 34 J. Fin. 
Econ. 31, 31 (1993).
19 See Arthur Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, 
Remarks of Chairman Arthur Levitt to the "SEC speaks" Conference, Washington D.C. (1998).
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securities markets by restoring the investor confidence by guaranteeing that they are not 
going to be "cheated by insiders".20 The theoretical literature tends also to argue that 
prohibiting insider trading would increase liquidity and decrease the cost of equity.21 This 
literature relies on the Akerlof's adverse-selection model to argue that the prohibition of 
insider trading will increase liquidity and decrease the cost of equity.22 This literature 
argues that, in presence of informed traders (insiders), risk-averse uninformed market 
participants facing the uncertainty of trading with insiders will be reluctant to invest on 
the market because they realize that they could be better off not trading. Therefore, this 
literature argues, the liquidity of the market will decrease because there is less 
participants on the market. This in turn poses another problem coming on the top of the 
adverse selection problem posed by insider trading. In illiquid markets, investors will 
have more difficulties to dispose of their securities on short notice. As a result, they will 
ask a higher risk premium under the form of a higher return on equity and a lower buy 
price to compensate the risks associated with illiquid markets and the possibility of 
trading with insiders. These costs associated with insider trading and illiquid markets are 
ultimately borne by the firms that see the costs of raising capital through issuing 
20
 Id. at 7. Now, while this point is beyond the scope of this paper, one might wonder what moral 
implications and economic repercussions such statements by government officials may have with respect to 
the public and investors once we realize that insider trading laws are ineffective.
21
 See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopolist, 62 bJ. Bus. 211
(1989); Utpal Bhattacharya and Matthew Spiegel. Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns, 4 Rev. Fin.
Stud. 255 (1991).
22 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanisms, 85 
Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970).
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securities to the public increasing. Therefore, this literature concludes that, by prohibiting 
insider trading, investors will be more willing to participate and will ask a lower risk 
premium for the risks associated with insider trading, hence, this will lead to lower costs 
of raising equity for firm and more liquid markets. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) also 
provide empirical evidence showing that countries enforcing insider trading laws enjoy 
greater level of liquidity and lower costs of equity than countries not enforcing insider 
trading laws or not having insider trading laws.23
This latter fact offers another explanation why the regulation of insider trading cannot 
be effective. The actual regulation has created the conditions for its ineffectiveness. It has 
generated consequences that have modified the environment to which the regulation 
originally applied. In particular, by increasing the market liquidity, the regulation has 
23 See Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. Fin. 75 (2002). 
However, it is important to emphasize that Bhattacharya and Daouk (at 104) are reluctant to attribute 
causality between enforcement of insider trading laws and liquidity and cost of equity because the first 
enforcement insider trading action is also related to an increase in country credit ratings. They therefore 
consider that, while their findings are instructive, there should be also another unobservable causal variable, 
namely, the attractiveness of the stock market to outside investors. There are also two factors not 
emphasized by the authors that may explain why investors participate more. First, insider trading laws 
create the illusion that there is no insider on the stock market to "cheat" the investors. Second, the rules
about publications of corporate information or, more recently, prohibitions about selected disclosure, create 
the illusion that they are "equally informed." It is necessary to recall here that the original purpose of 
insider trading laws has been to place investors on a "level playing field," that is, to place investors on an 
equal footing for the access of information and for profit-making on the stock market. See, for example, 
Council Directive 89/592/ECC of 13 November 1989, coordinating regulations on insider trading in 
Europe. See also Arthur Levitt, supra note 19, at 2.
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given the ability to strategic insiders to better hide their informed trades. With more 
liquid markets, insiders' trades become noisier and do not show up as fast as in illiquid 
markets where volumes are small and unusual trades show up very fast.24 In other words, 
the regulation of insider trading creates the "illusion" that there is no insider trading. As a 
result, investors are going to participate more, believing that insiders are not going to take 
advantage of them. With the liquidity of the stocks increasing, the impact of insiders' 
informed trades are going to be diluted among investors' transactions and will not show 
up as clearly as they would if stocks were illiquid. As a consequence, the regulatory 
authority will not be able to distinguish informed trades among the large volume of 
transactions realized on the markets and neither will they be able to observe abnormal 
volume or price changes. The more liquid the markets are, the more ineffective the use of 
circumstantial evidence to detect illegal insider trading is. 
3 Can the regulation of insider trading be effective? The empirical evidence
In this section, we examine whether the empirical literature findings are consistent 
with our previous analysis. As we will see, those studies are quite consistent with our 
previous analysis at two levels. First, they do show that, in general, (corporate) insiders 
refrain from trading around major corporate events because their transactions around 
those events are under greater scrutiny. On the other hand, those studies also show that 
insiders still make transactions based on non-public information around other corporate 
events as they keep realizing abnormal profits. Second, as we will show below, some 
studies show that there are some individuals other than registered insiders that have 
24
 Bris, supra note 3, at 9.
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access to inside information and base their securities transactions on such information to 
realize abnormal profits. The results of these studies tend to confirm our description of 
information networks and also the fact that a large variety of individuals come across 
inside information more or less incidentally.
There are two types of empirical study on insider trading regulation. The first type 
focuses on the impact of regulation on illegal insider dealing in the aggregate. The second 
kind focuses on insider trading around major corporate events such as takeover or 
earnings announcements and analyzes the impact of regulation on insiders' trading 
activity around these announcements. 
Before discussing these studies, it is necessary to point the data on insider trading
used in these studies come from the SEC's monthly published Official Summary of 
Insider Trading Transactions or the Ownership Reporting System (ORS) database 
compiled by the SEC in which, corporate (registered) insiders' securities transactions are 
reported and tracked as required by Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.25 As Meulbroek observes however, because insider trading based on inside 
information is illegal, it is likely that these corporate insiders do not report their informed 
transactions, which is problematic when it comes to measure the impact of regulation on 
25
 See supra note 1 for a definition of corporate insiders. In the ORS database, each corporate insider filing 
with the SEC is assigned an Insider Identifier Number. Once assigned, the SEC uses the Insider Identifier 
Number to track all transactions of the insider. In the ORS database are also reported among other things 
the nature of the ownership, the filer name and the nature of his relationship as an insider with the issuer, 
the security name, the issuer name, the nature of the transaction, the transaction amount, and the transaction 
price.
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illegal insider trading.26 Moreover, these studies usually do not take into account trading 
by unregistered (outside) insiders because they are not required to report their 
transactions to the SEC, which makes more difficult to identify their transactions.27
Therefore, while these studies as it will be shown offer interesting results, they largely 
underestimate the volume of insider trading taking place on the stock exchanges because 
they mostly focus on reported transactions by corporate insiders.
3.1 How Does Insider Trading Regulation Perform Overall?
The first type of study that we are going to discuss are studies that test how insider 
trading regulation perform overall in discouraging insiders from trading on inside 
information. Moreover, some of these studies test the impact of regulatory changes on the 
trading of insiders. Their starting observation is that, when insiders trade securities in 
their own firms, they are able to earn abnormal profits.28 This observation is in 
contradiction with the strong version of the efficient market hypothesis version stating
that "security prices fully reflect all available information" and, accordingly, any 
26
 Meulbroek, supra note 7.
27 An exemption is Arshadi and Eyssell's study that attempts to assess insider trading by outside-insiders by 
utilizing a series of tests to facilitate inferences about the behavior of outside-insiders. See Nasser Arshadi, 
and Thomas H. Eyssell. The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and Evidence 87-117
(1993).
28
 See James H. Lorie and Victor Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 
J. L. & Econ. 35 (1968); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974); 
Joseph E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. Fin. 1141 (1976); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' 
Profits, Cost of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. Fin. Eco. 189 (1986); and Meulbroek, supra note 7.
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systematic profit opportunities are precluded.29 Therefore, such a violation of the strong 
version of the efficient market hypothesis implies that not all available information is 
reflected in security prices, because, if it were, insiders would not be able to earn 
abnormal returns.30 Such ability to better predict price movements and earn abnormal 
returns can find its origin in the fact that insiders have access to and trade on the basis of
publicly unavailable information, which is not yet reflected in security prices.
In order to measure the effectiveness of insider trading laws, these studies 
traditionally test two hypotheses. First, as sanctions on insider trading increase, we 
should observe a reduction in insider trading as the expected net benefit (profitability) of 
insider trading decreases. Second, assuming that regulatory changes have any impact on 
insider's behaviors, we should also observe a reduction in the volume of insider 
transactions, that is, the volume of shares traded. 31
29
 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 
(1970) and Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. Fin. 1575 (1991).
30
 Standard theory of finance distinguishes between three forms of informational efficiency: the weak form, 
the semi-strong form, and the strong form. The weak form refers to past information while the semi-strong 
form refers only to all publicly available information. Generally, empirical evidence supports the weak and 
semi-strong forms of efficiency suggesting that publicly available information is reflected in the current 
market price.
31
 Those assumptions are derived from the standard economic theory of crime and punishment. See Gary S. 
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). Put in simple terms, 
such a theory argues that the "supply" of crime (in the present case, the amount of insider trading) is 
negatively related to the expected costs of committing crimes (those expected costs depend mainly of the 
probability of being caught and the amount of punishment incurred by the criminal if convicted). Given this 
negative relationship, the theory predicts that the supply of crime will decrease if either the probability of 
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Most of empirical studies assessing regulation effectiveness focus on the 1980s 
because they are characterized by significant increases in the level of enforcement of 
insider-trading regulations and sanctions against insider trading and, hence, are more 
likely to affect insider's trading behaviors. As Haddock and Macey report "from January 
22, 1982, through August, 29, 1986, the SEC initiated seventy-nine 10b-5 cases, an 
average of 17.2 per year, which represents a more than sixfold increase in the rate of 
enforcement".32 In addition, the percentage of cases brought against corporate insiders 
alone went from 49 to 80 percent. 
Seyhun developed a broad study over a period extending from 1975 to 1989
measuring "the effects of increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading 
regulation on corporate insiders".33 He examines open-market sales and purchases of 
registered insiders in NYSE, AMEX, and OTC firms and the fifteen-year sample is 
subdivided in three regulatory periods: the pre-Chiarella period (January 1975 – March 
1980) during which the then-doctrine was the parity-of-information doctrine; pre-Insider 
being caught or the amount of punishment increases. Therefore, when related to the issue of insider trading, 
in theory, as insider trading laws have increased the sanctions against insider trading; we should observe a 
reduction in supply of insider trading. Also, since given that regulatory authorities rely upon circumstantial 
evidence to detect and prosecute insider trading, we should also anticipate a reduction in insider trading 
volume as larger transaction volumes raise the probability of being detected and prosecuted for insider 
trading.
32
 See David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with 
an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. L. & Econ. 311, 333 (1987).
33
 See H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J. L. & Econ. 149 (1992).
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Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA)34  period (April 1980 – August 1984) during which 
the then-doctrine was the fiduciary-duty doctrine; and the post-ITSA period (September 
1984 – December 1989), which is characterized by both an increased enforcement and 
increased sanctions. Seyhun performs two sets of tests. First, he tests the effectiveness of 
insider-trading sanctions in the aggregate. Second, he tests the effects of case law on 
insider trading prior to earnings announcements and on insider trading prior to takeover 
announcements.35
For the aggregate sample, Seyhun finds that the profitability of insider-trading 
activity increased by 3.5 percent over the three periods. Contrary to theory's predictions, 
insider trading is the most profitable during the period with the higher enforcement and 
sanctions. For example, between 1984 and 1989, insiders' estimated average abnormal 
profit, after twelve months, was 7 percent while, between 1975 and 1980, their estimated 
average abnormal profit was 3.5 percent after twelve months.36 However, when  insiders' 
transactions are separated in purchases and sales over the three periods, Seyhun observes 
that:
Overall, [the] evidence indicates that in the 1980s insiders have increasingly shifted 
to a strategy of bailing out before bad news rather than buying on goods news.37
 However, this evidence does not change the overall conclusion regarding insider-
trading profitability. As a year-to-year analysis shows, "there are no measurable declines 
34
 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
35
 See after for a discussion of the second set of tests.
36
 See Seyhun, supra note 33, at 158-159 and Table 2.
37
 Id. at 162.
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in either frequency or profitability of insider-trading activity immediately following 
increases in the level of enforcement of insider-trading sanctions".38
Moreover, Seyhun tests the assumption that increases in enforcement and sanctions 
reduce the volume of insider trading. Overall, Seyhun reaches the same conclusion as the 
one regarding insider-trading profitability: "insiders have increased their trading activity 
in the 1980s in spite of increased sanctions. The greater insider-trading activity appears to 
mirror the growth in the market's overall trading volume. There is no evidence to suggest 
that increased regulations deterred insiders from trading".39
Finally, Seyhun attempts to determine whether regulatory changes had a temporary 
deterrent effect by examining potential changes in insider-trading activity around (i) 
March 1980, when the Chiarella decision was announced; (ii) August 1984, when ITSA 
was signed into law; and (iii) November 1988, when the Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA)40 was signed into law. The results show that "none of 
the three events were associated with declines in insider-trading activity. Instead, data 
suggest that insiders appeared not to be concerned with changes in statutes even on a 
temporary basis".41
38
 Id. at 162 and Table 4.
39
 Id. at 169 and Table 7.
40
 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 
(1988).
41
 See Seyhun, supra note 33, at 170-171 and Table 8.
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3.2 Insider Trading around Major Corporate Events
Bettis, Ducan, and Harmon provide a survey of empirical studies analyzing insider 
trading around major corporate events.42 These studies do not investigate the impact of 
the regulations or regulatory changes on insider trading per se. Rather they study whether 
or not insiders trade on inside information around major corporate events. 
Traditionally, major corporate events are closely followed and monitored by 
regulatory authorities such as the SEC because it is often around those events that major 
transactions and price changes occur. More particularly, given that fighting insider 
trading has become a major priority in SEC's agenda, we should expect that registered 
insider transactions would be under greater scrutiny around those events. Therefore, if 
insider trading laws were completely effective, insider activities around those events 
would cease. 43
The empirical evidence reviewed by Bettis et al. shows that, despite regulation, 
insiders continue to realize significant gains from nonpublic information. Not only do 
insiders continue to purchase shares before "good news" and sell shares before "bad 
news" but, actually, their trading volume has increased over time. The magnitude of 
abnormal returns realized or losses avoided also show that insiders trade on the basis of 
inside information. 
42 See J. Carr Bettis, William A. Ducan, and W. Ken Harmon, The Effectiveness of Insider Trading 
Regulations, 14 J. Applied Bus. Res. 53 (1998) and Appendix.
43
 Id. at 62.
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The preponderance of empirical evidence leads the authors to the conclusion  that 
"the legal and regulatory prohibitions have not been completely effective in preventing 
insiders from trading using their inside information".44
There are other studies that expressly analyzed the impact of regulations, and in 
particular, the increases of level and enforcement of prohibitions on insider trading 
around major corporate events. 
Performing a second set of tests, Seyhun analyzes the impact of case law on insiders' 
trading prior earnings and takeover announcements.45 Looking at the impact of case law, 
first, he examines "to which extent insiders exploit the upcoming earnings information 
during the three subperiods".46 He examines insider-trading activity during the thirty days 
preceding the earnings announcement day and whether the net number of transactions 
was in the same direction as the earnings surprise. He observes a decrease in insiders' 
exploitation of the upcoming earnings information through time. Prior to 1980, there was 
timely insider-trading activity in 12 percent of earning announcements months while, in 
the third period, timely insider-trading activity was in 9.3 percent of earning 
announcements months. Moreover, it also appears that the timely net number of 
transactions has also declined from an average of 0.29 transactions per month in the first 
subperiod to 0.22 transactions per month in the third subperiod. Therefore, Seyhun 
concludes that "in spite of the significant increases in insider-trading activity over time, 
insiders in fact became more reluctant to engage in timely trading before earnings 
44
 Id. at 65.
45
 See Seyhun, supra note 33, at 171-175.
46
 Id. at 171.
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announcements during the third subperiod. This evidence suggests that case law provided 
a measurable constraint on insider-trading activity immediately before earnings 
announcements".47
He also investigates the impact of case law on insider trading prior to takeover 
announcements.48 His findings are similar to those regarding insider-trading activity prior 
to earnings announcements. He finds that insider purchase activity during thirty days 
preceding the takeover announcement date falls from 14.5% to 7.1% over the three 
regulatory periods. Interpreting these results, he concludes that, with the increasing 
involvement of the courts, "insiders have become more and more reluctant to trade 
immediately before takeover announcements".49
Arshadi and Eyssell provide a more enlightening study as their analysis investigates 
the impact of regulatory changes on insider trading activity in target firms prior to tender 
offers.50 Arshadi and Eyssell observe that the increase of stringent penalties and 
enforcement activities by the SEC and the Department of Justice has significantly 
affected the patterns of reported trading by registered insiders prior to tender offer 
announcements.
47
 Id. at 173.
48
 Id. at 173-175.
49
 Id. at 175, emphasis added.
50 See Nasser Arshadi and Thomas H. Eyssell, The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory 
and Evidence 87-117 (1993). See also Nasser Arshadi and Thomas H. Eyssell, Regulatory Deterrence and 
Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers, 20 Financial Management, 30 (1991), for the 
examination of the impact of the ITSA of 1984 on registered insider trading in target firms' shares. See 
Appendix for more details.
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Their sample consists of 553 NYSE and AMEX firms that were targets of tender 
offers between January 1, 1976, and December 31, 1990.51 They develop their sample by 
examining each issue of the SEC News Digest published during the sample period and 
retrieving all firms listed as targets in tender offer announcements filings. From this 
sample, they eliminate 1) firms not on the 1990 CSRP daily returns tape, 2) self-tenders, 
3) subsequent bids in multiple-bid contests, and 4) firms that were mentioned in either 
The Wall Street Journal in a takeover-related context, or for which 13D filings were 
announced in The Wall Street Journal in the 60-day period preceding the tender offer 
announcement.52 Their study covers five regulatory periods, which are defined by five 
major events in the history of insider trading legislation and prosecution. These five 
major events are the Amendment of the Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 in the financial penalties and sanctions faced by insiders are increased (June 1975); 
the amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the passage of the Rule 
14e(3) prohibiting transactions based on non-public information about impending tender 
offers by anyone inside or outside of the firms involved (September 1980) 53; the passage 
of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (August 1984); the prosecutions of Dennis 
Levine, Ivan Boesky, and Martin Siegel (May 1986); and the passage of the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (November 1988).
Analyzing transactions of registered insiders, Arshadi and Eyssell observe that the 
volume of insider trading prior to tender offer announcement significantly fell over time 
51
 Data on registered insiders' transactions in their study comes from the ORS database.
52
 Arshadi and Eyssell, supra note 50, at 92.
53
 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3.
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and, particularly, after the passage of ITSA in 1984.54 In post-ITSA periods, registered 
insiders are, on average, net sellers in periods immediately preceding tender offer 
announcements while in pre-ITSA periods, they were, on average, net purchasers.
On the other hand, Arshadi and Eyssell observe that the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAR) for the sample firms in each of the regulatory periods are not consistent
with the fact that registered insiders' preannouncement trading has dramatically declined 
through time.55 They report that, by the announcement date, higher CAR (28.96% and 
32.35%) are observed in periods of broader and more severe anti-insider trading 
regulation (post-Levine et al. prosecutions and post-ITSFEA periods) in comparison with 
periods of less regulation (respectively, 27.55% and 17.2% for the periods pre-ITSA). 
Computing CAR over four intervals of event days before announcement day ((-10, -1), (-
5, -1), (-2, -1), and (0)) and across regulatory periods, they find that CAR in periods of 
intensive regulation and enforcement (periods post-Levine et al. prosecutions), without 
exception, are higher than in the other periods. All CAR are statistically significant at the 
ten percent level or better. Similarly, comparisons of inter-period differences in 
cumulative abnormal returns suggest that abnormal returns in later periods exceed those 
in earlier ones (all values are statistically significant). However, few differences exist in 
inter-period comparisons between periods of stringent regulations and periods where 
insider trading is less regulated. Investigating the magnitude of excess volumes preceding 
the announcement in each regulatory period, they find that excess preannouncement 
volumes in target firms' shares persist in spite of increasing severe legislations and 
54
 Arshadi and Eyssell, supra note 50, at 104-106.
55
 Id. at 97-104.
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aggressive enforcement by the regulatory authorities (volume coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant in every regulatory period).56 Inter-period volume 
comparisons show that the net daily share volume rises across time except for the last 
regulatory period where it slightly decreases. In general, evidence suggests that 
preannouncement run-ups in target firm share prices are associated with run-ups in the 
total volume of shares traded, which is, as previously seen, a contradiction with the fact 
that registered insider trading volume prior to tender offer announcements has declined 
with increasing stringent penalties and enforcement by regulatory authorities. 
However, as Arshadi and Eyssell observes:
Unfortunately, these results so far are aggregated in the sense that they deal with total 
returns and transactions volume. As such, they say little about who is (or is not) 
engaging in preannouncement trading.57***
To determine the source in such inconsistency, the authors attempt to separate the 
transactions of registered insiders from those of unregistered insiders. Their results show 
that the increase in transactions volume over the period analyzed is not explained by 
transactions from registered insiders at least in the three last regulatory periods. Arshadi 
and Eyssell find the increase in informed transactions is due to unregistered insiders. 
However, since insider trading by outside-insiders is almost impossible to observe 
because they are not required to register their transactions, Arshadi and Eyssell have to 
develop a series of tests to draw some inferences about the behavior of unregistered 
insiders. These tests allow them to conclude that the existence of persistent patterns of 
56
 Id. at 101-104.
57
 Id. at 104.
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preannouncement abnormal returns and increasing share volume despite regulatory 
changes by the existence of outside insider trading.
Given the screening of their sample, first, they attribute a low likelihood to the 
explanation advanced by Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter that preannouncement price and 
volume increases may be the result of the workings of a perfectly legal market for 
information.58
Second, they investigate a second possible explanation according to which 
preannouncement price and volume increases may be the result of successful prediction 
by market professionals acting on publicly available economic and financial information 
that a given firm will become a takeover target. In order to test the robustness of this 
assumption, they replicate Palepu's takeover prediction model and apply it to a portion of 
their own sample.59
58
 See Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, and Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Perspectives 49, 53 (1988). See Arshadi and Eyssell, supra note 
50, 106.
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 See Krishna G. Palepu, Predicting Takeover Targets, 8 J. Accounting & Econ. 3 (1986).  The model 
developed by Palepu arises from his observation that 1970s studies claiming that acquisition targets can be 
accurately predicted by models using public data are in contradiction with the observation that "the stock 
market does not seem to predict acquisition targets with a high degree of accuracy even three months prior 
to the announcement of takeover bids". He argues that this contradiction is explained by the fact that the 
methodology used by the earlier acquisition studies suffers from "three principal methodological flaws, 
which make their reported prediction accuracies unreliable". Palepu develops a takeover prediction model 
that avoids these biases resulting from these methodological flaws. In his model, Palepu uses a probability 
model (binomial logit model) "to specify the exact functional relationship between the firm characteristics 
and its acquisition likelihood in a given period." The independent variables are selected on the basis of a set 
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They find that the takeover prediction model could correctly identify only 42.9% of 
actual targets as such and misclassified 31.7% of the non-target firms as targets. They 
conclude that the explanatory power of the estimated model is quite small. Therefore, 
Arshadi and Eyssell contend that the existence of persistent patterns of preannouncement 
abnormal returns and increasing share volume despite regulatory changes cannot be 
explained by successful predictions by market professionals acting on publicly available 
economic and financial information.60
 Pursuing their analysis of the hypothesis that takeover prediction may explain these 
increases of preannouncement price and volume, CAR for each group for 250-day period 
ending on the last of the prediction day are calculated in four portfolios: 1) all firms 
predicted as targets by the model, 2) actual target firms correctly identified by the model, 
3) all firms not predicted as targets by the model, and 4) actual targets not predicted as 
such by the model. They argue that large CAR in actual target firms (38.75% for targets 
of six hypotheses, "frequently suggested in the academic and/or popular financial literature, on the types of 
firms that are likely to become acquisition targets." Instead of using a simple maximum likelihood (MLE) 
procedure to estimate the model parameters and the state probabilities, he uses a conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator (CMLE). The prediction ability of the model is tested on a large group of firms at a 
given time in order to make the prediction test sample resemble the population as closely as possible. 
Finally, instead of using an arbitrary cutoff probability of 0.5 as traditionally used in earlier acquisition 
prediction studies, he uses the optimal cutoff probability to test the possibility of earning excess returns by 
investing in potential targets identified by the model.  His findings are that "while the estimated model is 
found to be statistically significant, its explanatory power is quite small." He finds that "the estimated 
model's ability to predict targets is not superior to that of the stock market." His conclusion is that the 
model does not predict targets accurately. 
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classified correctly and 40.84% for targets classified incorrectly) could only have been 
predicted in possession of an accurate takeover prediction model, which is not the case 
according to their previous robustness test of Palepu's model. As they explain, if one uses
Palepu's model to classify firms, only two portfolios will be used: 1) one group of 
predicted targets and 2) one group of predicted non-target firms. When they calculate 
excess returns in each portfolio (each portfolio includes both actual and misidentified 
targets), CAR are -4.44% and -6.14% respectively for each portfolio. These results 
confirm their previous conclusion (and Palepu's ones) that "the model does not provide 
economically useful predictions" and that observed persistent patterns of 
preannouncement excess returns through time cannot be explained by the use of a 
takeover prediction model.61
Finally, to strengthen their theory that the use of inside information by outside-
insiders explains the existence of persistent patterns of preannouncement abnormal 
returns and increasing share volume despite the increase in regulation, they investigate 
inside-insider volume as a proportion of total daily share volume for each regulatory 
period. As expected, the results show that net inside-insider purchases as a proportion of 
total share volume fall over time (1.54% in the first regulatory period to -0.412% in the 
last regulatory period). After the passage of ITSA (regulatory period 3), registered 
insiders participate less prior to tender offer announcements. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that increasing regulations have deterrent effects on registered 
insider-trading activity. These latter results strongly enhance Arshadi and Eyssell's theory 
61 Id. at 113.
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that outside-insider trading explains the existence of persistent patterns of abnormal 
returns and increasing share volume in spite regulatory changes.
Their conclusions are consistent with Seyhun's. Increasingly stringent regulations and 
a vigorous regulatory attitude by the SEC and Justice Department have significantly 
altered registered insiders' behavior, particularly around corporate events which are 
subject to greater scrutiny by the regulatory authorities. 
However, as we argued above, this does not mean that insider trading per se has been 
eliminated as the existence through time of persistent patterns of abnormal returns and 
increasing share volume shows. Actually, it seems to have shifted from registered 
insiders to unregistered insiders (outside-insiders). As Seyhun did, Arshadi and Eyssell 
conclude that insider-trading regulation is overall ineffective in preventing trading on the 
basis of inside information.62
Seyhun and Bradley investigate insider trading preceding corporate bankruptcy 
announcements.63 Contrary to previous empirical studies64, they find that insiders do "bail 
out" on their stockholders prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. Actually, it appears that 
insiders begin to sell five years before the filing date and insiders' selling volume 
increases up to the announcement month. Moreover, in contrast to their predecessors, 
62
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Seyhun and Bradley look at the impact of regulatory changes on this type of insider 
trading.65
They first observe that the securities of firms that file bankruptcy petitions suffer 
significant losses in the years preceding the filing date. For example, in the second year 
before filing, the price of their shares dropped an average of 17%. In the year before, 
investors lost another 48% and in the month of filing, they lost another 28%. Over the 2-
year period before filing, the average cumulative loss amounts to 70%. Regarding the 
average abnormal loss for each year during the four years before filing, they are 
respectively 14%, 18%, 39%, and 66%. In the month of filing, the average abnormal loss 
amounts to 30%. Over the five year period before the filing date, the average abnormal 
loss reaches 206%.
When looking at registered insider trading prior to bankruptcy petition filing, Seyhun 
and Bradley find that "insiders are significant net sellers of their firm's shares in the 
months and years preceding a bankruptcy filing." They observe that, in the fifth year 
before filing a bankruptcy petition, insider selling represents a total disinvestment of 
$716,000 per firm. When compared with the fact that the returns to the stockholders of 
these firms are significantly negative in the fourth year before filing, the data suggest that 
"insiders possess privileged information regarding the future price of their firms' 
securities".66 Moreover, they observe that the trading pattern by top executives and 
officers shows that they have more information regarding their firms' future situation than 
65
 As explained by Seyhun and Bradley, this may partially explain why these previous empirical studies did 
not find that corporate managers do sell their insider holdings prior to filing a bankruptcy petition.
66
 Seyhun and Bradley, supra note 63, at 201.
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other insiders. Top executives are net sellers in every period and officers are net sellers in 
four of the five periods. 
Investigating the relationship between the timing of insider trading and security 
returns, Seyhun and Bradley find that insiders avoid the significant capital losses incurred 
by stockholders of bankrupt firms in the years before filing the petition by selling before 
the stock price declines and buying stock after prices have fallen.
After having investigated insider-trading timing and volume in bankrupt firms, 
Seyhun and Bradley analyze the impact of regulatory changes in the laws governing 
corporate bankruptcies and insider trading on these variables. Their observations are 
consistent with Seyhun's observations in his previous studies on the impact of regulatory 
changes on insider trading around major corporate events, which attract the scrutiny of 
the regulatory authorities. While we observe that insider selling volume before the filing 
increased despite an increasingly stringent legal environment, after the passage of the 
ITSA in 1984 insiders became more reluctant to sell their holdings in the 30 days 
preceding a filing. Since the passage of the ITSA, they find that "top executives have 
reported literally no transactions in their firms' shares in the 30 days preceding a filing." 
In other words, the increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading regulations 
did have an impact on insider-trading patterns, which manifest particularly by the fact 
that insiders avoid trading around events being the object of great scrutiny by the 
regulatory authorities. However, this does not mean that insider trading has disappeared, 
as the data show; actually, insiders continue to trade in their own company securities.
Two general observations can be made regarding the effectiveness of insider-trading 
regulations in deterring insiders from trading on the basis of inside information. First, 
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despite the increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading prohibitions, insiders 
continue to trade on the basis of inside information. The level of insider trading seems to 
have dramatically increased. However, it appears that the increase of stringent penalties 
and enforcement activities by the SEC and the Department of Justice, particularly against 
insiders trading on the basis of nonpublic information related to major corporate events, 
had had an impact on corporate insider-trading patterns. Corporate insiders do trade less 
around major corporate events. 
Second, while we do observe that these regulations had an impact on corporate 
insider-trading patterns, insider trading per se has not been eliminated. Actually, these 
regulations did nothing more than change the nature of insider trading; they have not 
eliminated or even reduced it. As Seyhun shows, the nature of insider trading has 
changed in the sense that (registered) insiders now trade more on inside information not 
related to major corporate events or at times other than those subject to strict scrutiny by 
regulators. Furthermore, as Arshadi and Eyssell show, the nature of insider trading has 
changed in the sense that the vast majority of insider trading is not derived so much from 
registered insiders whose transactions are under great scrutiny by the regulatory 
authorities as from unregistered insiders (outside-insiders). 
The empirical evidence seems to be consistent with our analysis of the impossibility 
for the regulation of insider trading to be effective. In the facts, the regulation of insider 
trading appears largely ineffective in preventing non-public information from circulating 
in the markets essentially due to the intangible nature of the information.
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4 Conclusion
This contribution of this paper was to study whether regulation of insider trading can 
be effective in deterring insiders from trading on non-public information. Our analysis 
shows that it is in theory and practice impossible for insider trading regulation to be 
effective. Because of the intangible nature of the information, insiders have a large 
variety of ways to escape the regulation of insider trading. Actually, it appears as some of 
the most recent findings in the empirical literature show that, despite the evolution and 
increases in enforcement and level of insider trading prohibitions, insider trading and its 
profitability have become more important. Therefore, we can argue that our analysis is 
consistent with the empirical literature.
Our conclusions draw some important implications for further empirical research on 
this issue such as attempting to develop a cost-benefit analysis of the regulation of insider 
trading. Despite that the regulation of insider trading does not eliminate insider trading, 
there may be some benefits such as increasing investors confidence, increasing market 
liquidity, or reducing the cost of capital that result from such regulation. Therefore, 
empirical research might also be done regarding whether such benefits outweigh the costs 
of such a regulation.
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APPENDIX
Survey of the Empirical Literature Pertaining to Corporate Insider Trading and Analysis of Strength of Relationship between Insider Trading and 
Other Factors and the Magnitude of Abnormal Returns Pertaining to Related Insider Activity
Panel A
Insider Trading Activity in Target Firms Around Takeover Announcements





Evaluation of insider activity in the 
month before the first announcement
of a takeover.
No evidence of rampant/frantic trading 
by corporate insiders of targets firms in 
the month before takeover 
announcements.
76% of the firms studied experienced 
no open market purchases or sales in 
the month prior to the announcement 
date, and only 12% had net positive 
market purchases.
Average CAR of 25.27% for the 






Test null hypothesis that the passage of 
ITSA had no effect on the actions of 
registered insiders. Preannouncement 
trading by registered insiders is at least 
as prevalent subsequent to the passage 
of the Act as it was before its passage.
Examine the volume and profitability of 
registered insider trading in target firms' 
shares before and after the passage of 
the ITSA of 1984.
Rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the number of net purchases in the 
event period is the same as in the 
estimation for the firm sample
(Computed test statistic Z = 3.24).
ACNT pre-ITSA = 1.81
ACTN post-ITSA = - 1.67
(statistically insignificant)
CWAPE reaches 9.89% by the 
week of the tender offer 
announcement in the pre-ITSA 
sample. Strong reversal of this 
pattern of observed for the post-
ITSA sample. CWAPE reaches -





Study examines average abnormal 
returns, trading volume and reported 
transactions of target firm insiders in 
periods preceding takeover 
announcements.
Test whether insiders change their 
trading activity in the period before the 
first public announcement of a takeover 
bid (but after they have private 
knowledge of the upcoming 
announcement).
They conclude that there is no 
increase in purchasing during the 
time when insiders are informed 
about upcoming takeover 
announcement.
Average CAR of 32.41% for the 
60 day period prior to the 




Looks briefly at insider activity before 
takeovers
Evaluates (non-statistically) whether 
large trading profits made by insiders 
were because of trading before takeover 
announcements (and/or earnings 
surprises).
Found that the proportion of takeover 
announcements months (i.e. the 30 
days preceding takeover 
announcements) with insider 
purchases ranges from 14.1% to 









Investigates whether insiders of 
bankrupt firms hold less stock or 
reduce their holdings compared to 
what we observed for insiders of 
similar firms that do not go bankrupt.
No much evidence to support the idea 





Investigates what insiders do before 
bankruptcy's and before voluntary 
liquidations.
Uses a standardized measure of the net 
number of purchases (purchases – sales) 
and also does Chi-Square test to look at 
differences between insider activity in 
the case of bankruptcy versus voluntary 
liquidation using purchases and sales 
separately.
Net number of purchases analysis 
shows significant differences 
between the two periods (at the 0.01 
level for voluntary liquidation sample 
and 0.01 level for the bankruptcy 
sample).
The per firm average CAR of 
16.07% for the 36 months leading 
up to the announced voluntary 
conversion. CAR of -39.04% for 







Measure insider trading during the 31 
month period surrounding the first 
public announcement of a bankruptcy 
filing of OTC firms.
Test using a control sample of firms and 
the sample of bankrupt firms. The 
relative frequencies of buy and sell 
transactions by insiders are compared 
between the two groups.
Find that insiders in firms that go 
bankrupt do significantly (at the 0.01 
level) more selling the 18-13 months 
and 6-1 months prior to the 
bankruptcy announcement..
Mean losses avoided by insider 
sellers of 27.55%.
Panel C
Insider Trading Activity Around Other Corporate News Events (e.g. Dividend Announcements) 
Finnerty 
(1976a) 1967-1972
Identification of relationship between 
insider buying/selling and (1) a large 
range of fundamental variables (e.g. 
future earnings and future dividends) 
and (2) firm characteristics (e.g. firm 
size).
Weighted factor coefficients from a 
linear discriminant function were used 
to evaluate the difference among the 
means of the factors.
Very strong evidence of the 
relationship between insider trading 
activity and the size (significant at 
0.0000), earnings (significant at 





Evaluates relationship between insider 
trading and the disclosure of 
management earnings forecasts, and 
measures performance of the insiders 
who bought/sold before and 
sold/bought after positive/negative 
management earnings forecasts.
The relationship between the direction 
of the insider activity measures and the 
magnitude of abnormal returns was 
measured. Also, the magnitude of profits 
to the insiders for their trading was 
measured.
The direction of insider trading and 
magnitude of abnormal return in the 
3 days around forecast date was 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
Abnormal return associated with 
trading activity was significant at the 
0.0005 level.
Mean 3-day abnormal returns 
ranged from 1.49% to 14.43% for 
positive insider trading firms and 







Investigates whether insiders buy their 
stock prior to favorable earnings and 
dividend announcements and hence 
abnormal profits.
Used the period from 2 to 60 days 
before announcements of higher (at least 
10% different) than expected 
earnings/dividends and measured the 
return to the insiders.
p-values for the abnormal return to 
insiders for these cases were 
significant at levels ranging from 
0.036 (where earnings were less than 
expected) to 0.000 (were less than 
expected).
ARs ranged from 34.71% when 
dividends were greater than 






Paper examines the joint effects, both 
additive and interactive of the surprise 
in annual earnings announcements and 
prior levels of insider trading 
surrounding earnings announcements.
Used the trading activity in the 75 day 
period(s) before earnings 
announcements. Used ANCOVA to test 
the main effect between trading activity 
and earnings surprise.
Three day abnormal returns 
associated with each marginal 
trading classification were signed in 
accordance with the expected 
implications of the signals (e.g. 
positive trading would have positive 
abnormal returns).
Insider purchase activity yielded 3 
day CAR of 1.38% on average. 




Look at net measures of insider trading 
activity as signaling that is relevant for 
future dividend announcements.
Test using various regressions between 
abnormal (excess) returns on/around 
dividend announcement dates and 
various insider trading measures.
Insider trading prior to the 
announcement has significant 
explanatory power for the returns 
that are present on the dividend 
announcement date.
1-day AR for the insider selling 






Investigate the trading behavior of 
insiders surrounding the release of 
earnings information.
Looked at changes in insider activity in 
the period preceding EPS 
announcements.
Also investigated the actual profit (loss) 
earned by insiders after their 
purchases/sales.
Found significant decreases in 
purchasing activity before earnings 
announcements, but there are 
significant increases in selling before 
bad news announcements. 
Differences between purchases and 
sales are highly significant in all 
cases.
Mean abnormal profits to insiders 
who bought from -50 to -26 days 
before earnings announcement of 
5.8%. Abnormal profits exceed 8% 
for good news firms.
Study that does not appear in the original survey by Bettis, Duncan, and Harmon (1998).
Source: J. Carr Bettis, William A. Ducan, and W. Ken 
Harmon, The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulations, 
14 J. Applied Bus. Res. 53 (1998)
